Al-Qaeda Training Manual

The US Department of Justice (US DOJ) has publicly disclosed the ‘Al-Qaeda Training Manual’ which was recovered from the house of arrested alleged terrorist Khalid Khaliq on July 2005 in Manchester, England.

The training manual containing comprehensive chapters of lessons written in Islamic language has been translated in English; following US DOJ’s handling of a trial on the spate of terrorist attacks of the UK and the US vital installations (US DOJ, 2008).

Accordingly, to cite, the training manual outlines four substantial topics, such as (1) Lesson 1: Principles of Military Organization, (2) Lesson 2: Necessary Qualifications and characteristics for the Organization’s Member, (3) Lesson 3: Counterfeit Currency and Forged Documents, and (4) Lesson 4: Organization Military Bases (US DOJ, 2008).
In this paper, the position of a counterterrorism specialist will be discussed, relating the hypothetical questions on what implications for counterterrorism are contained in the training manual and what counterterrorism strategy can be developed in light of the manual.
Implications for counterterrorism
As a point of view on the classification of the training manual as a “captured document”, counterterrorism specialist may critically consider two fundamental implications for counterterrorism, such as (1) revalidation of the captured document, and (2) operational review on counterterrorism strategies. This critical reconsideration underscores the “way of the systems” in assessing the counterterrorism campaigns in both military and civilian organizations.
Revalidation of the captured document would exert extensive effort for key military units and the intelligence community to analyze the veracity of information contained in the training manual.
The first scenario to implement the revalidation could be in the field personnel, like the CIA’s HumInt (human intelligence) clandestine operatives that verifies and classifies the “substantive category” of such information. The second scenario could be the “analytical method”, examining the depth and breadth of the captured document in the aspect of strategic purpose and intent; referring to the psychological warfare (psywar) of the literature.
The operational review on counterterrorism strategies could be in line with redefining and reformulating short and long term plans or tactics purposely “to counter” the operation plan or “OPLAN” that can be found in the training manual. Overall, the implication would take into effect the enactment of policy framework that deals with counterterrorism.
Counterterrorism Strategy
As cited from the training manual, Al-Qaeda massively recruits individuals working in borders, seaports and airports, of which will carryout the mission to blast or destroy vital places, like public amusement centers, embassies, economic zones, communication and media establishments, and government and military facilities to name a few (US DOJ, 2008).
Given the above situation, the first employment of a counterterrorism strategy is to secure the possible, potential and vulnerable places for terrorist attacks. One aspect of security measures is through “personnel profiling” or the conduct of evaluating the profiles of working personnel and monitoring their activities. In which case, a security guideline must be decisively implemented in working areas.
However, the counterterrorism strategy can be efficiently and effectively implemented without legal constraints by implementing the necessary, existing and applicable laws, regulations and state policies that are meant to safeguard the working places and promote lawful prevention against terrorism. Thus, mobilization of strategic counterterrorism campaigns can be implemented at the extent of public tolerance and compliance.
On the other hand, it is a common knowledge that the US Naval facility in Guantanamo, Cuba has been used as a prison of arrested terrorists, in which the controversy of alleged inhuman treatment of prisoners has recently ordered by President Barrack Obama to “dispose of utilizing the facility as a torture den”.
By mentioning this information, it owe to relate the situation that counterterrorism specialist or expert may rely on applying psychological and physical torture as a method to “extract information” or obtain it as a first-hand validation from detained terrorists, partly of the strategy in reaffirming the information which is also called by the intelligence community as “rendition”.