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Critical Psychiatry, Critical Psychology, and the Behaviorism
of B. F. Skinner

Murray J. Goddard
University of New Brunswick

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Critical psychiatry suggests that the currently dominant medical model in psychiatry overstates internal
disturbance and understates environmental stressors as important causal factors in psychological distress.
Critical psychology suggests that when individuals experience problems in a culture, psychology
emphasizes individual, rather than cultural, change. This article provides a brief overview of critical
psychiatry and critical psychology and outlines how both movements share important epistemological
similarities with the writings of B. F. Skinner, the founder of radical behaviorism.

Keywords: critical psychiatry, critical psychology, radical behaviorism, B. F. Skinner

Losses disguised as wins (LDWs) are common in modern video
slot machines that encourage players to bet on multiple pay lines
and follow any winning combination with flashing lights and
high-fidelity audio, even when the amount won is less than the
amount wagered (Harrigan, Dixon, MacLaren, Collins, & Fugel-
sang, 2011). As one elderly gentleman noted, “I eventually real-
ized that if I kept on winning, I was going to go broke” (Dixon,
Harrigan, Sandhu, Collins, & Fugelsang, 2010, p. 1824).

The concept of LDWs provides a salient illustration of how
critical psychiatry, critical psychology, and the behaviorism of
B. F. Skinner share common ground. For example, critical psychi-
atry challenges the dominant medical model by suggesting that
problematic gambling may have less to do with internal “pathol-
ogy” and more to do with the environmental circumstances pro-
moting gambling (Reith, 2007). Critical psychology emphasizes
that, by focusing on altering problematic gambling in an individ-
ual, psychology preserves the status quo and deflects attention
away from cultural practices that may encourage, and promote,
gambling (Griffiths, Parke, Wood, & Parke, 2006). Finally, Skin-
ner used gambling to illustrate the power of reinforcement sched-
ules to maintain behavior, and he not only resented the gambling
industry but was also angered by politicians who raised money
through gambling initiatives (Knapp, 1997; see also Fantino,
2008). In an article, with uncharacteristic sarcasm, Skinner
(1978b) suggested that perhaps the wealthy could avoid paying
taxes altogether, if lotteries were introduced in Grade 1 classrooms
and the reward schedule was gradually reduced in magnitude over
time.

The present article first briefly outlines Skinner’s radical behav-
iorism, with a particular emphasis on those aspects most relevant
to subsequent discussions of critical psychiatry and critical psy-
chology. Second, critical psychiatry’s history and conceptual foun-
dations are briefly outlined before highlighting the epistemological
similarities with Skinner’s writings and, third, a similar approach
follows for critical psychology. Finally, the article concludes with
a summary section.

Radical Behaviorism

Skinner’s radical behaviorism emphasizes a functional level
of analysis (or selectionism) that may be contrasted with main-
stream psychology’s emphasis on essentialism. For example,
Schlinger (2003) discussed how intelligence may be conceived
of as a relatively fixed quantity that individuals possess (essen-
tialism) or as a set of behaviors that arise given a particular set
of organism– environment interactions (selectionism). Skinner
consistently emphasized the pragmatic advantages of selection-
ism, aligning psychology with both the natural sciences and
Darwin’s theory of natural selection (Skinner, 1971; see also
Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001). Further, essentialism has the
inherent dangers of circular reasoning and reification, and may
curtail inquiry, because essential properties are treated as giv-
ens, requiring no further explanation (Skinner, 1950, 1963).

Essentialism may also lead to the proliferation of additional
theoretical constructs, particularly mentalistic constructs that are
hypothesized to reside within autonomous man (Skinner, 1971).
For example, when an essential-like structure (e.g., short-term
memory or academic intelligence) is unable to explain divergent
data, additional memories or intelligences are often added, leading
to endless debates about whether a particular behavior is “really”
evidence for a particular type of memory or intelligence (Palmer &
Donahoe, 1992; Schlinger, 2003). Notably, young children rou-
tinely engage in essentialist thinking (Gelman, 2004), and essen-
tialism is common when ordinary people explain human behavior;
for example, unsavory behavior may be explained by saying that a
person is a “pervert” (Malle, 2004, p. 162).

In a recent extension of Skinner’s radical behaviorism, Field and
Hineline (2008) noted that psychological phenomena are intrinsi-

Murray J. Goddard, Department of Psychology, University of New
Brunswick.

Supported by a sabbatical leave from the University of New Brunswick,
Saint John and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada (Grant 42025). I thank Vance MacLaren for his insights on modern
video slot machines and Marilyn MacLeod for her support.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Murray J.
Goddard, Department of Psychology, University of New Brunswick, Saint
John, NB, Canada, E2L 4L5. E-mail: Goddard@unbsj.ca

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Review of General Psychology © 2014 American Psychological Association
2014, Vol. 18, No. 3,

208

–215 1089-2680/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000012

208

mailto:Goddard@unbsj.ca

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000012

cally tripolar, involving an organism, the environment (both pres-
ent and past), and what an organism does (the organism’s behav-
ior). Typically, psychology privileges organism-based (rather than
environment-based) explanations of behavior that preserve the
principle of contiguous causation characteristic of 17th century
science. To align with contemporary developments in science,
psychology must abandon “dispositioning” and focus on the en-
vironmental side of the organism–environment�behavioral triad,
as emphasized in Skinner’s radical behaviorism (Field & Hineline,
2008).

Given Skinner’s focus on the environmental contributions to
behavior, Skinner also advocated for cultural change to improve
human welfare. For example, Skinner discussed the design of a
better culture and the problem of control in Science and Human
Behavior (Skinner, 1953) and speculated about a utopian society in
Walden Two (Skinner, 1976; see also Altus & Morris, 2009).
Further, Skinner (1986) described five detrimental cultural prac-
tices in “What is Wrong With Daily Life in the Western World?”
and addressed psychology’s failure to institute cultural change in
both “Why We Are Not Acting to Save the World” (Skinner,
1987b) and “Are We Free to Have a Future?” (Skinner, 1978a).
Unfortunately, although Skinner was initially optimistic about the
powers of behavioral analysis to solve the major problems facing
humanity, he became less optimistic later in life (Chance, 2007).
Critical psychology also advocates for cultural change, and the
steps used by critical psychology to advance cultural change
sometimes show striking similarities with Skinner’s radical behav-
iorism.

Critical Psychiatry

Psychiatry is probably unique within the health care system of
generating extensive scholarly criticism in addition to anger and
outrage from the people contacting psychiatric services, some of
whom identify as “psychiatric survivors” (Bracken & Thomas,
2009). In part, this criticism and anger may be traced back to the
1980 publication of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III), in which behavioral
symptoms were transformed from broad failures to adapt to the
environment (that were continuous with normality) to entities
reflecting an underlying disease process (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005;
see also Conrad & Barker, 2010). Note that the publication of
DSM–III ushered in a transformation from a perspective that
resembled Skinnerian selectionism to a perspective that resembled
psychological essentialism.

Although DSM–III radically transformed mental health, psychi-
atry had been the target of extensive scholarly criticism long
before DSM–III (Double, 2002). For example, R. D. Laing (1965)
suggested that dysfunctional relationships (rather than biology)
were critical in mental health and, in a study resembling a Skin-
nerian functional level of analysis, Laing and Esterson (1970)
found that high expressed emotion in a family (consisting of
hostility, emotional overinvolvement, and criticism) likely contrib-
uted to the distress and disordered behavior in a person subse-
quently labeled with schizophrenia (see also Modrow, 2003).
Dysfunctional family relationships may also be expressed in in-
formal nurse’s comments, such as “I think we’ve got the wrong
one in here” (Johnstone, 2000, p. 75).

In addition to Laing, Thomas Szasz was also a relentless critic
of psychiatry (Szasz, 1970, 1974). For example, Szasz (1974)
suggested that, in the absence of a biological marker, “mental
illness” was likely a metaphor and (echoing Skinner’s focus on
organism–environment interactions) suggested that “problems in
living” was a more accurate and useful metaphor (see also Joseph,
2011; Sarbin, 1990). Szasz (1970) also compared current beliefs in
the reality of psychiatric labels with medieval beliefs in the reality
of witchcraft.

Today, critical psychiatry emphasizes that no biological test can
confirm any psychiatric label and the former chair of the DSM–IV
Task Force has predicted that the incorporation of biological tests
in psychiatric diagnosis will apply to only a small percentage of
individuals (Frances & Widiger, 2012). With only a small percent-
age of individuals having a biological dysfunction, this would
explain why the evidence supporting a genetic basis for many
psychiatric labels is weak (Joseph, 2006) and why dimensional
structure differences between clinical and nonclinical respondents,
on published data from several personality and psychopathology
inventories, were so rare that “one would be hard pressed to argue
against the overall pattern of similarity” (O’Connor, 2002, p. 974).

Given that only a small percentage of individuals may have a
biological dysfunction, critical psychiatry emphasizes that emo-
tional distress and disordered behavior predominantly arise from
environmental factors, like income inequality (Albee, 2005), and
that the large number of therapists in Western cultures may be a
sign of a cultural defect (Pande, 1968). This is consistent with
Skinner’s position that emotional distress and disordered behavior
predominantly arise from environmental factors and that therapists
should explore environmental factors first when instituting treat-
ment (Skinner, 1961b). Even unusual behaviors (like hearing
voices) may result because “positive reinforcement for voice hear-
ing includes companionship, comfort, positive guidance, and spir-
itual enlightenment” and negative reinforcement includes “remov-
ing responsibility or the stress of having to make independent
decisions” (Boyle, 2006, p. 196). The possible involvement of
positive and negative reinforcement in hearing voices converges
with Skinner’s position that unusual behaviors may be “simply the
result of a history of reinforcement” (Skinner, 1961b, p. 198; see
also Flora, 2004; Richelle, 1993, p. 156).

Note also that some psychiatric labels (e.g., compulsive buying
disorder or pyromania) resemble “dispositioning” and have a dis-
tinctly essentialist flavor (Haslam & Ernst, 2002). Consequently,
psychiatric labels may be social constructions rather than true
entities reflecting an underlying biological dysfunction (Horwitz,
2002). Notably, Guerin (1992) presented a behavior analysis of
socially constructed knowledge that was based on Skinner’s (1957/
1992) functional analysis of verbal behavior. That is, because
cultural terms may arise from interactions with other people (rather
than from the nonsocial environment), there is a great potential for
modern societies to maintain counterfactual knowledge because
behavior is becoming more verbal and the controls on verbal
behavior are becoming detached from nonsocial environmental
controls.

Guerin’s (1992) behavior analysis of socially constructed
knowledge is relevant to critical psychiatry. For example, in a
statement that might have been made by Szasz (1970), the cultural
dominance of medical models makes it difficult for many people to
think outside them: “rather like asking medieval Europeans to

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209CRITICAL PSYCHIATRY

think about a world without kings or queens” (Boyle, 2006, p.
191). Konner (2008) has also suggested that people may have a
great deal of resiliency because human evolutionary history was
likely characterized by disease, animal attacks, famine, and homi-
cide. However, mental health interventions, which are routinely
encouraged after a potentially traumatic experience, may inadver-
tently convey to people that recovery over time is not a typical
human response to trauma (Konner, 2008). Finally, Watters (2010)
has presented evidence that pharmaceutical companies have at-
tempted to replace indigenous understandings of mental health,
with Western medical models, that more readily translate into
profitable drug treatments.

Like Skinner, critical psychiatry also emphasizes the dangers of
reification, that is, the dangers of believing that any psychiatric
label (including schizophrenia) must be an entity having an inde-
pendent existence (Jacobs & Cohen, 2010; see also Barrett, 1996;
Boyle, 2002; Romme & Escher, 2000; Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980).
As previously noted in the section on Radical Behaviorism, Skin-
ner (1950) was well aware of the dangers of reification and
cautioned that psychologists frequently postulate “events taking
place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, de-
scribed in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different
dimensions” (p. 193). Further, Skinner (1961c) expressed concerns
that hypothesized inner entities in psychiatry “abandon the tech-
niques of measurement which would otherwise be a natural heri-
tage from earlier achievements in other sciences” (p. 210).

Critical psychiatry also suggests that the expanded number of
psychiatric labels (from about 100 in DSM-I to about 400 in
DSM-5) raises the possibility that psychiatric labels are invented
rather than discovered (Houts, 2002; see also Marecek & Hare-
Mustin, 2009; Pérez-Álvarez & García-Montes, 2007). Recall that
an expanded number of theoretical constructs was also a problem
with the essential-like terms that were common in intelligence and
memory research (Palmer & Donahoe, 1992; Schlinger, 2003).
Similarly, Skinner noted that “Freud did not discover the mental
apparatus but rather invented it” (Skinner, 1961a, p. 186), and
Skinner cautioned that “psychotherapy is rich in explanatory fic-
tions. Behavior itself has not been accepted as a subject matter in
its own right, but only as an indication of something wrong
somewhere else” (Skinner, 1953, pp. 372–373).

Critical psychiatry also emphasizes that differences in power,
between psychiatrists and distressed people, may result in mis-
treatment (Rosenhan, 1973; see also Goddard, 2011). Skinner
(1974) also emphasized that differences in power may result in
mistreatment, particularly mistreatment “of the very young, of the
aged, of prisoners, of psychotics, and of the retarded” (pp. 210–
211). For example, prepubertal youth may be receiving as many as
seven concurrent psychiatric drugs, although there are limited data
on drug safety and efficacy, because studies typically use adult
samples (Safer, Zito, & dosReis, 2003). Previously distressed, but
fully recovered, adults have also reported that psychiatrists erro-
neously predicted they would lose custody of their children, would
never hold a job, or would be on medication forever (Hagen &
Nixon, 2011).

Clinicians may also not be overly familiar with the 400 (or so)
hypothesized psychiatric labels; for example, in a sample of mental
health professionals (that included 20 licensed psychiatrists and 20
licensed psychologists), only about 22 disorders could be recalled
by at least 25% of participants (Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan, 2009).

Finally, accurate diagnosis may not necessarily even benefit dis-
tressed people because psychiatrists might “debate the fine points
about the correct diagnosis for a disturbed client, but always would
prescribe Haldol regardless of the outcome of the diagnostic de-
bate” (Kirk & Kutchins, 2008, p. 235).

Skinner (1953) was also critical of the use of drugs or electric
shock in psychiatry that were not far removed from the idea that
“the Devil or some other intruding personality is in temporary
‘possession’ of the body” (p. 374). Skinner also expressed con-
cerns that shock therapy may have begun as aversive control (see
Epstein, 1980, pp. 6–7), supporting evidence that, although shock
therapy was a terrifying experience, some people were fearful that
expressing any misgivings might annoy their psychiatrist and
prolong their confinement (Johnstone & Frith, 2005). Skinner and
Vaughan (1983) also noted that although “American take billions
of pills every year . . . drugs that make you feel better can keep you
from attacking the condition that makes you feel bad” (p. 118; see
also Flora, 2007).

Compare Skinner’s criticisms to recent evidence that, although
psychiatry promotes the metaphor that drugs are like taking insulin
for diabetes, drugs may actually be like taking alcohol for social
anxiety (Moncrieff, 2009). Further, “the misconception that mental
illness can be cured by drugs discourages the provision of decent
services” (Moncrieff, 2009, p. 240; see also Whitaker, 2010). Drug
companies may also suppress data showing harmful side effects
(Breggin, 2006), and there may be conflicts of interest in psychi-
atry. For example, some shock therapy researchers have held
shares in the companies that marketed the shock machines (Andre,
2009). The former editor of The New England Journal of Medicine
noted that because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration re-
quires only that a new drug show short-term benefit relative to
placebo, the long-term drug effects are often unknown and there is
a genuine possibility that a new drug may be inferior to an older
drug or treatment (Angell, 2005). In a study that compared three
new blood pressure drugs with a generic diuretic (that had been on
the market for over 50 years), the new drugs were no more
effective than the diuretic at lowering blood pressure, and they had
more dangerous side effects (Angell, 2005, p. 96; see also Healy,
2012).

As is generally well known, Skinner (1938, 1963) also advo-
cated within-individual designs that intensely studied a few sub-
jects rather than the multiple-subject designs that are common in
psychology (O’Donohue, Callaghan, & Ruckstuhl, 1998). In Skin-
ner’s (1966) words “instead of studying a thousand rats for one
hour each, or a hundred rats for 10 hours each, the investigator is
likely to study one rat for a thousand hours” (p. 21).

Similarly, standard psychiatric studies, using multiple-subject
designs, may ignore individual patient’s accounts of their lived
experiences (Hornstein, 2009). Although there are over 600 first-
person accounts published in English alone, first-person accounts
have been largely ignored by psychiatric researchers (Adame &
Hornstein, 2006). First-person accounts may also challenge med-
ical models; for example, in-depth interviews show that depression
in women may be a product of social, political, and interpersonal
realities, rather than a product of neurochemical dysregulation
(Lafrance, 2009; see also Stoppard, 1999, 2000). One psychiatrist
candidly admitted that he actually knew very little about his
patient’s lives because most therapy sessions consisted of a 15-min
“med check” (Carlat, 2010, p. 11). Consequently, psychiatric prac-

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210 GODDARD

tice may make it less likely that an alliance forms with an empa-
thetic therapist that may be critical for therapeutic progress
(Wampold, 2001).

Finally, understating environmental stressors in psychiatry may
be due to “cultural assumptions about the primacy of the autono-
mous individual” (Boyle, 2011, p. 34). Further, because a disease
refers to a process within the body of an individual, psychiatric
symptoms are “conceived to be a part of a system of behavior that
is located entirely within the patient and that is independent of the
social context” (Scheff, 2007, p. 180). Compare these comments
with Skinner’s view that a science of human behavior proceeds by
“questioning the control exercised by autonomous man” (Skinner,
1971, p. 19) and that an experimental analysis “shifts the deter-
mination of behavior from autonomous man to the environment”
(Skinner, 1971, p. 205).

Critical Psychology

Critical psychology suggests that current cultural practices may
be detrimental to human well-being and that psychologists may
preserve the status quo by focusing on individual, rather than
cultural, change (Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009). Critical
psychology builds on Fromm’s (1965) dual conception of freedom
as being free from social and psychological oppression and being
free to pursue important life goals (Austin & Prilleltensky, 2001).

The roots of critical psychology may also be traced to the
French philosopher Michel Foucault, who famously argued that
knowledge was intimately connected with power and that a pow-
er�knowledge nexus determines what behaviors are desired, how
objects and people are to be understood, and how deviant individ-
uals are to be corrected and disciplined (Foucault, 1980). Note the
similarity between Foucault’s ideas with previously discussed ev-
idence, in the Critical Psychiatry section, that the powerful phar-
maceutical industry may be altering indigenous understandings of
mental health for financial gain (Watters, 2010). Foucault’s dis-
cussion of power also shares some similarity with Skinner’s con-
cept of countercontrol, in which individuals may oppose aversive
control through negative reinforcement, such as by escaping, at-
tacking, or passively resisting (Skinner, 1974). Foucault’s ideas are
also relevant to evidence from critical psychology that some pio-
neers in intelligence testing may have been motivated by racial
prejudice (Kamin, 1974) or that the academic contributions of
female psychologists had been neglected in standard psychology
textbooks (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).

Critical psychology emphasizes that academic work in psychol-
ogy is not well aligned with action-oriented social justice initia-
tives, and critical psychology often asks the question “What is
psychology to do?” (Prilleltensky, 2012, p. 617). Critical psychol-
ogy also notes that cultural change may require behavioral change
because “changing beliefs without accompanying behaviors is
futile” (Prilleltensky, 2012, p. 622) and that “awareness is good,
but action is better” (Fox, 2003, p. 299). Further, if people ask
what reinforces them to participate in cultural change, people can
improve their efforts by “analyzing antecedents, behaviors, and
consequences” (Prilleltensky, 2012, p. 621). Critical psychology
also suggests that because our own society may fall short of
historical and theoretical alternatives, it is even helpful to “spec-
ulate about utopian societies” (Fox, 1993, p. 239).

As previously discussed in the Radical Behaviorism section,
there is little doubt that Skinner advocated cultural change to
improve human well-being (Skinner, 1953) and Skinner speculated
about a utopian society in Walden Two (Skinner, 1976). Skinner
would also agree with critical psychology’s focus on behavioral
(rather than belief) changes because “changing a mind . . . is an
ineffective way of changing behavior” (Skinner, 1971, pp. 91–92)
and “psychology has remained . . . primarily a search for internal
determiners” (Skinner, 1987a, p. 780). Of course, critical psychol-
ogy’s emphasis on behavioral change by analyzing antecedents,
behaviors, and consequences was Skinner’s basic unit of analysis
and Skinner’s constant search for ways to change his own behavior
was “a lifestyle” (Epstein, 1997, p. 547; see also Bjork, 1993;
Smith, 1992; Vargas, 2004).

As might be expected, there may also be a certain degree of
overlap between critical psychiatry and critical psychology. For
example, a consumer culture that creates an ethos of winners and
losers, coupled with income inequality and parental divorce, may
partly contribute to increased childhood distress (Timimi, 2010).
Medicalizing this distress with a label (like attention-deficit/hy-
peractivity disorder [ADHD]) may, however, be more of a quick-
fix solution that is encouraged by drug companies (Timimi, 2009).
Common drug treatments for ADHD (using psychostimulants like
methylphenidate [Ritalin]) may also cause adverse neuronal
changes in humans (Andersen, 2003) and prolonged memory im-
pairments in rats (LeBlanc-Duchin & Taukulis, 2007). Thus,
ADHD may be a social construction (as noted by critical psychi-
atry), but increased labeling may reflect genuine increases in
childhood distress caused by detrimental cultural practices (as
noted by critical psychology).

Critical psychology is perhaps most concerned with a North
American individualistic worldview, encouraging competitiveness
and consumerism, which may be harmful to human relationships
and a sustainable planet (Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009).
Skinner shared these concerns, suggesting that competitiveness
and consumerism may lead to war, overconsumption, and, poten-
tially, human extinction (Skinner, 1971). “That many people have
begun to find a recital of these dangers tiresome is perhaps an even
greater threat” (Skinner, 1987b, p. 1).

Skinner suggested that because people are predominantly social
creatures, social control may be exercised by direct face-to-face
contact when all individuals have essentially the same power
(Skinner, 1978c). Research showing that conformity and social
influence powerfully affect humans, possibly outside introspective
awareness (Pronin, 2008), supports Skinner’s position. However,
Skinner (1978d) noted that because power is concentrated in those
with money, an introduction of a maximum wage law (in combi-
nation with a minimum wage law) may be prudent. Echoing the
concerns of Foucault (1980), Skinner (1987b) was particularly
concerned about powerful financial interests influencing govern-
ment policy “for their own aggrandizement . . . in conflict with the
future of the human species” (p. 7). Sharing Skinner’s concerns,
Chomsky (2003) also argued that the U.S. government has “per-
sisted in undermining international efforts to reduce threats to the
environment that are recognized to be severe, with pretexts that
barely concealed their devotion to narrow sectors of private
power” (p. 3).

In addition, consistent with Skinner’s view that “behavior may
be extensively modified by variables of which . . . the subject is

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211CRITICAL PSYCHIATRY

never aware” (Skinner, 1963, p. 957), there are now also many
surprising findings of human behaviors unconsciously influenced
by environmental factors (Goddard, 2009). As critical psychology
expands into areas like health, social, and personality psychology,
critical psychologists may benefit from an appreciation that envi-
ronmental factors can influence human behavior outside conscious
introspective awareness.

For example, eating may be unconsciously influenced by adver-
tising (Harris, Bargh, & Brownell, 2009) and the food industry
spends approximately $10 billion annually to promote primarily
unhealthy foods to children and youth (Brownell & Horgen, 2004).
Further, because food costs are low, relative to labor and process-
ing, competition encourages larger portions, or value-size pricing
(a lower price per unit for larger portions), to increase market share
(Young & Nestle, 2012). Small increases in dishware size may
also increase caloric intake (Pratt, Croager, & Rosenberg, 2012)
and traditional societies undergoing Westernization routinely show
weight gain (Brown & Konner, 1987). Artificial sweeteners (like
saccharine) may also paradoxically cause weight gain by disrupt-
ing fundamental homeostatic processes (Swithers & Davidson,
2008). Thus, consistent with Skinner’s emphasis that environmen-
tal factors powerfully influence human behavior, an appreciation
that unhealthy eating may be powerfully influenced by environ-
mental factors helps to redress mainstream health psychology’s
highly dispositional approach (Chamberlain & Murray, 2009; see
also Wansink, 2013).

A consumer culture may also create human needs rather than
fulfill them (Leatherman & Goodman, 2005). For example, sales
were poor when black pearls were first introduced, but sales
increased when prices were substantially raised, possibly because
only wealthy consumers could then afford the commodity (see
Ariely, 2008, pp. 23–25). Skinner also expressed concerns that
people are prepared to deal with coercive cultural practices, but
may not object to other, possibly more powerful and dangerous,
behavioral control techniques, such as media influences (Rogers &
Skinner, 1956). In a statement that might have been made by
Foucault (1980), Chomsky also shared Skinner’s concerns as “the
media serve, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal
interests that control and finance them” (Herman & Chomsky,
2002, p. xi). Guerin (1992) also emphasized the media’s ability to
maintain counterfactual knowledge, in the absence of a social
group (see also Pollay, 1986), and critical psychiatry has expressed
concerns about the accuracy of pharmaceutical advertisements on
television (Achamallah, 2011) and in leading medical journals
(Valenstein, 1998, pp. 197–199).

Finally, capitalist assumptions that certain abstract concepts
(like gross domestic product [GDP]) mirror human well-being may
be misleading, because GDP rises when there are more car crashes
(Anielski, 2007). The potential problem of abstract concepts (like
GDP) was also pointed out by Skinner, who noted that abstract
concepts can lead to oversights and errors, particularly when the
abstractions are separated from the original, specific, concrete
referents (Grant, 2012).

Given that many psychologists may also be immersed in a North
American individualistic worldview, perhaps, in hindsight, it
should come as less of a surprise that some theories in psychology
contain an implicit assumption of human autonomy (Baum &
Heath, 1992). Skinner also speculated that, although a culture may
have initially gained a great deal by emphasizing that individuals

are in control of their behavior, it is possible that such a philosophy
“has remote consequences which will prove to be dangerous” (see
Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 487).

Further, some empirical results, like the common factors (or
“Dodo bird”) effect in therapy, may be quite difficult for many
psychologists to accept (Wampold, 2001). Surely, if a distressed
person was like a car that needed to be fixed, some methods of
repair would be better (or worse) than others? What psychologists
may be missing is that a human may actually be a very odd car that
may fail to start properly unless you park it in the vicinity of other
cars. Empirical evidence that human verbal behavior is uncon-
sciously influenced by social rewards (like smiling or attention) is
also difficult to accommodate in a worldview with an implicit
assumption of human autonomy (Krasner, 1958; see also Guerin &
Miyazaki, 2006; Schlinger, 2008; Skinner, 1957/1992).

Summary and Conclusion

Critical psychiatry suggests that psychiatric labels may be social
constructions and that psychiatry overstates internal pathology and
understates environmental stressors as important causal factors in
emotional distress. Similarly, Skinner suggested that psychiatric la-
bels may be “explanatory fictions” and that emotional distress may be
a product of extreme environmental conditions. Critical psychiatry
also shares Skinner’s concerns that the use of drugs (or electric shock)
may be harmful and that differences in power (between psychiatrists
and distressed people) may result in mistreatment and insufficient
attention to individual life circumstances.

Critical psychology suggests that psychology must better advo-
cate for cultural change and that speculation about a utopian
society is helpful. Similarly, Skinner was a powerful advocate for
cultural change and speculated about a utopian society in Walden
Two. Critical psychology also shares Skinner’s concerns that en-
vironmental factors powerfully influence human behavior and that
competition and consumerism may harm human relationships and
a sustainable planet.

Finally, what are the possible benefits of alerting academics to
the extensive overlap between Skinner’s radical behaviorism and
critical psychiatry and critical psychology? First, behavior analysts
may be encouraged to participate in critical psychiatry’s efforts to
reform DSM-5. Indeed, the objections to psychiatric diagnosis are
now so widespread (and well rehearsed) that the main challenge
for social science is to explain how and why psychiatric diagnosis
has managed to survive (Pilgrim, 2007).

Second, critical psychology’s efforts to challenge detrimental
cultural practices may be improved by increased familiarity with
Skinner’s writings and the extensive behavior-analytic literature.
Behavior analysts may also be alerted to relevant research in
critical psychology that may not be published in standard behavior
analytic journals. Persistent, and harmful, cultural practices may
have a great deal of inertia, and the collaboration between behavior
analysts and critical psychologists may be helpful in instituting
meaningful cultural change.

Third, although many academics may consider Skinner “history,”
this view may be fundamentally altered when comparisons show
striking epistemological similarities between Skinner’s writings and
contemporary topics that are of interest to many psychologists. For
example, Skinnerian behaviorism shares important similarities with
positive psychology (Adams, 2012) and current empirical research in

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212 GODDARD

psychology (Goddard, 2012), suggesting that there may be a very real
opportunity for reintegrating Skinnerian behaviorism with main-
stream psychology (Overskeid, 2008). The present article joins these
efforts by showing that Skinnerian behaviorism also shares important
similarities with critical psychiatry and critical psychology. Although
some North Americans might presume that the increased pharmaceu-
tical treatment of emotional distress (and worldviews emphasizing
consumerism) demonstrates human progress, Skinner might suggest
that they are LDWs.

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214 GODDARD

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.001

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0015104

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Received June 26, 2014
Accepted August 1, 2014 �

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215CRITICAL PSYCHIATRY

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1154199

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.42.8.780

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.42.8.780

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11256-000

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.47.2.216

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0086828

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0735-7044.122.1.161

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1138741600004832

  • Critical Psychiatry, Critical Psychology, and the Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner
  • Radical Behaviorism

    Critical Psychiatry

    Critical Psychology

    Summary and Conclusion

    References

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